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The „Chain of Legitimation“
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s concept of a „chain of legitimation“ has become a
central element in the construction and legal understanding of German democracy.
He was not the one who invented the term or the concept, nor the one who, as a
judge, introduced it into the case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court
(FCC). In the case-law of the court, the term „chain of legitimation“ first appears
in a decision of December 1974, long before Böckenförde became a member of
the court  (BVerfGE 38, 258, 275, cf. also BVerfGE 47, 253, 275: „uninterrupted“
chain of legitimation required; BVerfGE 52, 95,121). Much earlier, Ulrich Scheuner
had mentioned the „chain of legitimation running from the people via parliament
to the government“ in a discussion remark at the 1957 conference of the German
Association of Public Law Scholars. Böckenförde had postulated an “uninterrupted
democratic chain of legitimation” in his book Verfassungsfragen der Richterwahl
(p., 73 f.). In elaborating that postulate,1)Cf., e.g., Böckenförde, Demokratie
als Verfassungsprinzip, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des
Staatsrechts, Vol. II, C.F Müller, 2004, § 24, 429, 436 ff., paras. 11 ff. he often
referred to Roman Herzogs Allgemeine Staatslehre of 1971 or Herzogs commentary
on Art. 20 of the Basic law. The idea that legitimacy can only be conveyed via
an uninterrupted chain of legitimation was probably borrowed from the law of
negotiable instruments, where the requirement that a series of endorsements must
be uninterrupted to transfer the entitlement had long since been circumscribed as
demanding an uninterrupted chain of legitimation.
During Böckenförde’s term on the court, the FCC has eventually adopted a refined
standard of democratic legitimation of public authority, distinguishing different types
of legitimation and their interplay, with the idea of a chain of legitimation as a central
element. There is no doubt about Böckenförde’s intellectual influence on the court,
here, even though recent decisions have interpreted that standard somewhat less
strictly than Böckenförde may have had in mind.
Obviously, the chain has not been working in the way it is supposed to for quite
some time. In Germany as elsewhere, trust in democratic institutions has been
declining over recent decades. Democracy is in decay in some countries where
populist parties have taken over, and more or less at risk in some others.
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As a remedy, bestsellings books advise us to stop voting and rely on decision-
makers drawn by lot instead, or to resort to „expertocracy“, and a German
habilitation thesis suggests that any nexus between voters on the one hand and
elected members of parliament on the other ought to be severed in order to set
the latter free to pursue the good and the true instead of base voter interests.
The idea that elections and other concatenated ties of responsibility must link the
exercise of public power to the will and the interests of those in whom that power
ultimately resides, and the underlying commonsensical notions of how principal-
agent-relationships must be institutionalised if they are to work in the interest
of the principal, is apparently on the retreat even among political scientists and
constitutional lawyers.
The current surge of populist movements, the anti-democratic reflections of a wide-
spread feeling that something is going fundamentally wrong (even) in democratic
societies – are they symptoms of fundamental deficits in representative democracy?
Can Böckenförde’s theory of democracy help us understand what is going on?
The requirement of an uninterrupted chain of legitimation was put to the front by
Böckenförde in response to claims that had become popular in the 1968 student
movement and its aftermath. All organizations and organizational units within
society, that claim went, must work like democracies in their own right, with the
majority of their members – students in universities, employees in private enterprise
and state agencies, etc. – determining the course of action. With respect to
institutions exercising public power, the requirement of an uninterrupted chain of
legitimation linking all exercise of public power to the people as a whole rejected that
claim. It denied, as a matter of constitutional law, the idea that the most democratic
state of affairs is one with all kinds of internal spin-off democracies. The point of
the chain-concept was to establish pervasive democratic control by the people
as a whole, as opposed to fragmented group control, as a core concept of the
constitutional principle of democracy. A characteristic FCC decision reflecting
Böckenförde’s view on the matter is BVerfGE 93, 37, 66 ff., according to which the
principle of democracy sets limits to employee participation in the management
of public administration. Böckenförde highlights the importance of contemporary
conflicts over the relevant understanding of democracy where he mentions that
one of the reasons why as a candidate for a judgeship on the FCC, he, a Social
Democrat, had been welcome to the Christian Democrats was his opposition to
“total democratization” (an amazing terminological concession to his opponents
´ claim that what they advocated was more democratic).2)Biographical Interview,
conducted by Dieter Gosewinkel, 369, 388; for Böckenförde’s approach to the more
general question of the reach of the principle of democracy, see Böckenförde, Die
Bedeutung der Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft im demokratischen
Sozialstaat der Gegenwart, 209, 225 ff.
In its function as a limit to group and organizational aspirations to compartmentalized
collective self-determination, the requirement of an uninterrupted chain of
legitimacy connecting any exercise of public power to the citizenry as a whole is
inextricably linked to Böckenförde’s idea of the state as the institution with an overall
responsibility for the common weal – overall responsibility of course not in the sense
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that governmental tasks and powers must be unlimited or unorganized, but in the
sense that as far as public power goes in a liberal democracy under the rule of
law, it must not be dissipated, it must not be fragmented in a way that will make
it ineffective. In Böckenförde’s view, only overreaching power and responsibility
enable the state to accommodate all the disparate interests within a society and
perform its integrative task by setting limits to market forces and seeing to it that
inequalities do not mount up boundlessly as they would in a free market without
corrective intervention. This idea has guided Böckenförde’s analyses of the problems
created by the dismantling of state powers in the process of Globalization and
Europeanization.3)See Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy
and Statehood in a time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization
[1998], 325, 340 ff;; id., Which Path is Europe Taking? [1997], 343, 347 ff., 350 ff.,
363 ff. In these analyses, explanations for much of the current trouble – including
the economic and political problems arising from the European Monetary Union and,
more generally, from the strategy of enforcing political union via market integration –
can be found.
Böckenförde’s Dictum and the Postulate of
Homogeneity
With much of his work, Böckenförde addressed the qualms which Catholics had
about liberal, secular democracy. He successfully offered views that helped to
fulfil a conciliatory mission. Like any successful mediation, this one, too, met the
convincees where they were.
The most prominent example is Böckenförde’s famous dictum according to which the
liberal, secular state „lives by prerequisites which it cannot itself guarantee“. This,
Böckenförde explains, is the „great venture“ (das große Wagnis) it has undertaken
for freedom’s sake.4)Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der
Säkularisation, 112 (my translations). What Böckenförde addresses here is not
the trivial fact that neither persons nor societal entities ever have full control of
the prerequisites of their persistence. The point of the dictum is that the liberal,
secular state is prevented by its very essence, by its defining characteristics, from
prescribing and enforcing the convictions on which it hinges. To inveterate adherents
of liberal democracy, Böckenförde’s qualification of liberal, secular democracy as
a venturous undertaking may sound like a warning that health is risky because it
might deteriorate to illness. For the Catholic milieu of which Böckenförde himself was
part, however, the avowal conceding that a political system renouncing imperative
divine guidance in politics is a venture without backstop was a familiar starting
point. It served as the basis for Böckenförde’s concept of liberal democracy as an
enterprise that needs common ethical ground and where religion still has a part to
play5)Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation
[1967], 229, 230; . Cf. also id., Der säkularisierte Staat, S. 16 ff., 24.; for the (limited)
„directive power“ (potestas directiva) of the Catholic church vis-à-vis Catholic
believers id., So ist Autonomie nicht gemeint (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung).
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– a concept that ridded liberal democracy of its Kelsenian handicap, i.e. of the
perception that it is for relativists only.
Böckenförde’s related claim, prominently adopted in the FCC’s Maastricht judgment,
that liberal, secular democracy must rely on some kind of homogeneity, which
referred to no more than the common ethical ground just mentioned, and a tie of
collective identity („commonality“, „us-consciousness“)6)See, e.g., Böckenförde,
Politische Theorie und Politische Theologie (1983), 330 ff., is another instance of
Böckenfördian modernization in continuity. Whatever the explanatory power of the
doctrine7)For a skeptical assessment according to which, in the very thin meaning
in which the doctrine is acceptable, it is practically tautological, see Lübbe-Wolff,
Homogenes Volk. Über Homogenitätspostulate und Integration., it was certainly
most efficient as an instrument of doctrinal transition from a religious worldview that
was not compatible with democracy to one that was, i.e. as a tool of ideological
modernization in continuity. The Catholic idea of concordia (concord, harmony) as a
necessary basis of community,8)Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, Das Prinzip der praktischen
Konkordanz, in: Dirk Herrmann / Achim Krämer (eds.), Festschrift für Christian
Kirchberg, Boorberg. 2017, 143, 144 f, with further references. originally aimed at
unity in faith, was not only transcended, but preserved, howsoever diffuse its new
content.
Tides of polarization
The liberal, secular democracy so convincingly advocated by Böckenförde not
only requires civic loyalty. It should also help to produce such loyalty, help to turn
enemies into participants in peaceful political competition, help to deconstruct be-all-
and-end-all ideologies and replace them by pragmatic search for best solutions and
compromise. As a matter of fact, however, what we have seen in post-World-War-II
democracies are tides of depolarisation and repolarisation.
In Germany and other European countries, the political left-right-polarisation which
had intensified with the so-called movement of  1968, and which had absorbed
or otherwise superseded the remnants of earlier ideological cleavages, faded
away in the period following the breakdown of the soviet-communist bloc regimes.
In recent years, however, not just in Germany, but all over Europe, polarisation
has been on the rise again. The tidal currents are not synchronized all over –
in the US, the temporal cycle has been somewhat different from that in Europe.
Conditions are not everywhere the same, and it may take different amounts of time
in different periods and places for undercurrents of discontent to surface in a new
tidal wave of polarisation. At any rate, representative democracy seems less able to
stabilize states of depolarization once achieved than one would expect in view of the
legitimising functions ascribed to it.
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The depolarization paradox
I would suggest that this can be explained by, inter alia, a paradoxical, dysfunctional
side effect of depolarisation.
Big ideological complexes that typically go along with political polarisation, full monty
worldviews offering comprehensive interpretation and guidance, tend to be less open
to democratic negotiation and compromise than more fragmented and pragmatic
convictions. In that respect, depolarisation and the civilization of worldviews that
Böckenförde’s theory is concerned with facilitate the functioning of representative
democracy. Conversely, it would seem that, the better representative democracy
works, the more it will, in turn, contribute to depolarisation.
But there is a flipside to the beneficial effects of depolarisation. Polarisation
makes it easier to identify the political party that will serve your preferences. With
depolarisation, by contrast, it becomes increasingly difficult for political parties and
governments to develop and implement programs that will, in essence, match the
preferences of voters. All they can offer is tied-up political packages with mixed
contents. No one would accept the equivalent in a grocery store. We would hate
it if only various shopping bags pre-filled by someone else were available, but as
customer-kings of representative democracy, we have to put up with a pre-packaged
political parcel, often repacked in coalition negotiations, for the next couple of years.
The lesser the degree of political polarisation, the more this is likely to produce
tedium and aversion with the packages on sale as well as with the salesmanship
of those who bargain over how to pack them and how to keep them distingishable
from other offers in supply. At advanced stages of depolarization, efforts to sell
these party-political packages as products of a coherent political idea are bound
to become utterly unconvincing. At that stage, sharper ideological distinctions, i.e.
more polarization, will be called for, and with a sufficient basis in more substantive
discontent, it is likely to come. Of course, polarization is not to be advised as a
remedy. It is bad medicine. Well-designed elements of direct democracy would seem
much better tailored to the problem. Polarization may, however, at high costs, help
restore voter satisfaction with what their electoral vote can achieve or prevent. The
current rise in voter turnout indicates such an effect. The recent federal election
in Germany, with the populist AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) in contention, has
brought millions of former non-voters back to the polls.
The paradoxical potential of depolarization in representative democracy is obviously
not the only factor, and certainly not even the most important one, explaining the
frustration with the political system that is actually virulent in Western democracies.
Experiences and expectations of individual and/or collective advancement or decline,
economic and other, count for much more. For a better understanding of why
western democracies have underperformed on that score in recent decades, reading
Böckenförde is instructive in several respects. His explanation of the problems
related to economic transnationalisation and the reduction of public power to frame
market forces and readjust their distributional effects that goes along with it have
already been mentioned. The underlying analyses of equality issues can be read as
modern theoretical foundations of the “social state” (Sozialstaat).9)For Böckenförde’s
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reception of the classical German writer advocating a social state, Lorenz von
Stein, see Böckenförde, Lorenz von Stein als Theoretiker der Bewegung von Staat
und Gesellschaft zum Sozialstaat. They include accounts of how equal liberties
necessarily produce inequalities, of social prerequisites of meaningful liberty, and
of what follows from this for the role of government in a democracy aiming at self-
determination which is “substantive” rather than just formally guaranteed on paper
(or, to put it in more Anglo-Saxon terms: aiming at liberty in action rather than
just liberty in the books). What follows is the never-ending need for readjusting
governmental action to prevent – in a way that is compatible with liberal principles
– social inequality from undermining the basis of liberty and self-determination, and
for rules preventing economic status from translating into political power.10)See
Böckenförde, Protection of Liberty Against Societal Power [1975]; id. (with Christoph
Enders), Freiheit und Recht, Freiheit und Staat, 42, 49 ff., 53 ff.; cf. also id., in:
Biographical Interview, 377 ff., 405 f. Böckenförde has also addressed the risks
inherent in the increasing fragmentation of arenas of communication.11)Böckenförde,
The Future of Political Autonomy, 338. To see this problem, he did not have to
wait for the web-based filter bubbles which many see as threats to democracy
today. It was enough to witness the fragmentation of earlier audiovisual media,
and in particular the privatization of TV broadcasting (which, in Germany, had been
exclusively public as long as the limited availability of transmit frequencies did not
allow for plural private supply). It is important to remember these and other earlier
origins of communicative fragmentation in order to realize that the related losses
of common ground and of adequate perception of realities are not just problems of
certain subcultures of people who never leave their social media filter bubbles, but
problems of society as a whole, including the so-called elites.
_____________________
* Most of this text was first prepared for a conference held at the Center for
Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld University, in 2016. Mirjam Künkler and Tine
Stein have provided critical remarks –thanks!
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